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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ETHA BAKER FLOWERS, AURA BAKER 
HORTON, and TULlE BAKI<JR RANDALL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
WRIGHTS, INCORPORATED, 
A Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves simply a determination of the 
meaning of certain language embodied in a written lease 
between plaintiff's predecessor (their mother) as lessor, 
and the defendant, as lessee. If the language means as 
contended for by defendant, then the defendant ad-
mittedly has paid all of the rentals owing by it, except 
as to the amount of $211.80, which has heretofore been 
tendered and refused. On the other hand, if the lan-
guage means as contended by plaintiff, defendant may 
owe additional rentals. We use the word "may" ad-
visedly, as there are other factors that then enter into 
the determination, and which will hereinafter be dis-
cussed. 
The lease in question was executed by plai11tiffH' 
mother, Allie C. Baker, as lessor, and the defendant, as 
lessee, on or about February 11, 1939, for a five year 
term commencing February 15, 1939. Defendant hn<l 
occupied the premises for some time prior to the exe-
cution of this formal lease. (Tr. 10) On June 23, 1941, 
the term of the then existing lease was extewled to 
February 15, 1949. 
The important language of the lease, insofar as 
this case is concerned, is, except possibly for one matter, 
set out in plaintiff's brief. We here again set it out for 
convenience in referring to it. 
At the very beginning of the lease the parties are 
positively identified-Allie C. Baker (plaintiffs' pre-
decessor), as the "Lessor", and Wrights, Incorporated, 
as the "Lessee". 
The lease then provides : 
''And said lessee, in consideration of the leas-
ing of the premises aforesaid by said lessor to it, 
covenants to pay as the annual rental for said 
premises three (3) per cent of the total sales 
volume of the lessee, provided, however, that the 
lessee agrees to pay a minimum rental of Two 
Thousand Niue Hundred and Forty Dollars 
($2,940.00) per year, payable in monthly install-
ments * * *." 
"It is understood and agreed that the books of 
said lessee shall be open for inspection to verify 
the annual sales reported by it". (Italics added). 
Section 3 of the lease then provides : 
"That neither the lessee nor its legal rep-
resentatives will let or underlet said premises, or 
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assign this lease, without the written assent of the 
lessor first had and obtained thereto, except that 
said lessee may sublet space in the said premises 
to dPpartmeuts selling other lines of merchandise 
than those offered for sale by the lessee, that is 
to say, women's coats, suits, furs and dresses". 
(Italics added.) 
The case involves simply the question of whether 
defendant has paid all of the rentals it was obligated by 
the lease to pay, or if it owes additional rentals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the lease itself, other factual matters 
were developed in tho trial relating to the matter in 
issue. We state them briefly. 
In what was designated a pro-trial order, the parties 
stipulated and agreed to certain facts, which stipulation, 
and facts embodied therein, was formally offered in 
evidence by Plaintiffs and received by the Court: 
1. That the dollar volume of sales made by the de-
fendant from the premises during the ten years of the 
lease was $1,300,926.56 ( H-020). 
2. That tho dollar volume of sales made and effected 
by the sub-lessee of the shoe department during the ten 
years of the lease was $822,620.09 (R-020). 
3. That the dollar volume of sales made and effected 
by the sub-lessee of the millin.ery department was $131,-
330.73 (R-021). 
4. That during the ten year term of the lease the 
defendant paid as rentals $'10,37 4.64, and tendered the 
additional sum of $211.80, which latter amount plaintiffs 
refused to accept. ( R-021) 
3 
5. The pre-trial order then contained the following 
stipulation of the parties: 
"That except as to the facts hereinabove 
stipulated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, supra, 
(being the matters set out in paragraph 1, 2, 3 
and 4 above) the plaintiffs and defendants each 
reserve, without prejudice or qualification of any 
kind, the right to tender, offer and give evidence 
on any issue * * * ". 
Defendant at the time of the execution of the lease 
was in the business of selling women's coats, suits, furs, 
and dresses. This appears from the lease itself. Its 
total sales for the period in question were $1,300,926.57. 
Defendant sub-let space in the premises to a sub-lessee 
who sold shoes, and whose total sales were $822,620.09. 
It also sub-let space in the premises to a sub-lessee who 
sold millinery, and whose total sales were $131,330.73. 
Defendant paid rentals on the basis of its own 
sales. These payments were accepted by the plaintiffs 
up through the final month of the lease, but when the 
final percentage rentals for the period from January 
1st to February 15, 1~)49, amounting to $211.80 wer.e 
tendered, plaintiffs refused the same, and brought this 
action, claiming defendant should have been paying on 
the basis of the sales of its sub-lessees, as well as 
its own sales, and owed an additional $28,880.73 as per-
centage rentals on such sales. 
On the trial, in addition to the foregoing facts. 
plaintiffs proved by letters from defendant to plaintiffs 
that on May 21. 1945, defendant paid the accrued per-
centage rentals on the sales of "Wrights, Inc." up 
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through December 31, 1944. (Flxhibit D.) Similar let-
ters accompanied the checks for the percentage rentals 
for the years 1946, 1946, 1947 and 1948. (Exhibits E, F, 
G. H, and I). In each it was made clear by defendant 
that the percPutage rentals paid were computed on the 
basis of defendant's sale~; only. 
Plaintiffs also offered to prove in effect that by 
reason of the mannn in which the sales by the sub-
lessees were handled they should be construed by the 
court to be sales by the t1efendant itself. This offer 
was refused. The basis of snch refusal, and the cor-
rectness of the ruling, ~will be considered infra. 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence the defend-
ant moved for a non-suit upon the ground that plaintiffs 
had failed to prove that defendant owed additional rent-
als as claimed by plaintiffs, which motion was granted. 
Plaintiffs' appeal apparently is predicated upon 
two propositions, 
First, that under the lease defendant was obligated 
to pay percentage rentals on the basis of sales by its 
sub-lessees. as well as its own sales, and, 
Second, the lower court nrred in refusing plaintiffs' 
offer of proof as to the manner aud methods of handling 
the sales by the sub-lessees. 
We will discuss these points in reverse order. 
ARGDfllljJNT 
THE LO\VI~R COUR1' IHD NO'r ERR IN REFUSING 
PLAIN'l'IB'FS' CH'Fl<~R O:U' PROOF, 
(A) BECA USJ1~ I'r \VAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT 
WlTH 'l'HE STlPULA'l'ED ]'ACTS, AND 
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(B) THE JDVIDJDNCE OFFERED vVAS WHOL-
LY DIMArrERIAL. 
Plaintiffs offered to prove, in effect, that by reason 
of the manner in which the sub-lessees conducted their 
operations, their sales should be construed to be sales 
by Wrights, Incorporated. We submit the lower court 
was right in refusing this offer, first, because it was in 
direct conflict with the stipulated facts, and, second 
the evidence offered was wholly immaterial. 
A. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING PLAINTIFFS' OFFER OF PROOF, 
BECAUSE IT WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT 
WITH 1'HE STIPULATED ]~ACTS. 
As previously pointed out, the parties in the pre-
trial order stipulated and agreed as to the dollar volume 
of defendant's sales. Paragraph 2 of such order and 
stipulation recited ''That without further proof or 
evidence and for the purpose of this action the volume 
of sales by defendant from the premises under lease to 
it" is $1,300,926.57. By Paragraph 6 it was stipulated in 
effect that such was accepted as the fact, and evidence 
to the contrary would not be tendered or offered. Yet 
plaintiffs' offer of proof went to the heart of that very 
stipulated fact, namely, that the sales by defendant were 
not $1,300,92G.57, as agreed upon, but were something 
other and different. 
The effectiveness awl conclusiveness of stipulations 
entered into between parties to litigation reg·arding 
factual matters involved has been before the courts on 
many occasions. The law seems to be well settled that 
stipulations made by pal'ties to a judicial proceeding, 
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or by their attorneys, nrc binding upon those who make 
them aud those whom the.'' lawfully represent. and also 
upou the trial aml appellate courts. They cannot be 
contradicted by evidence~ tending to show the facts to be 
otherwise. 'l'his court ~:;o held in tho case of Rickenberg 
u. Capital CJarar;e, G8 Utah 30, 249 P. 121, as follows: 
"In this connectiou it should be stated that 
respondent's counsel insist that the latter was 
not guilty of driving the car at the time of his 
arrest, but assert that the same was driven by a 
lad about 13 years of age. They have set forth 
the evidence upon that s11.bject and it supports 
their contention. We remark. a complete answer 
to the foregoing conteution is that it was stipu-
lated at the hearing in tho court below, and the 
stipulation appears in the record, that the re-
~:;pondent was convicted of the offense of driving 
an automobile while intoxicated. Respondent is 
bound by that stipulation, and so are we." 
We point out particularly that in such a case, as 
observed by the court, the evidence supported facts con-
trary to those stipulated, hut thi::; court said: 
"Respondeut i::; bound by that stipulation, 
and so are we.'' 
We recognize, of course, that in the interests of 
justice parties to stipulated facts do not become irre-
vocably bound thereby. and may, under certain con-
ditions, withdraw therefrom, or repudiate the same. The 
rule with respect thereto appears to be well covered in 
the decision of the Supremo Court of Nebraska in the 
case of Lebarron v. City of Harvard, 2G2 N. W. 26, as 
follows: 
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"A stipulation by the parties as to the facts. 
so long as it stands, is conclusive between them, 
and cannot be contradicted by evidence tending 
to show the facts otherwise. City of Chicago v. 
Drexel, 141 Ill. 89,30 N. E. 774; Ward & Co. v. 
Industrial Commission. 304 Ill. 576, 136 N. E. 
796; 5 Wigmore, Evidence ( 2d Ed.) 605, Sec. 
2590; Andrews v. Olaff, 99 Conn. 530, 122 A. 108. 
Parties will not be relieved from stipulations 
in the absence of a clear showing that the matter 
stipulated is untrue. and then only if the appli-
cation for such relief is seasonably made, and 
good cause is shown for granting it. 25 R. C. L. 
1099, Sec. 6; Smith v. Smith, 90 Fla. 824, 107 Sou. 
257; Muller v. Dows. 94 U. S. 277, 24 L. FJd. 76; 
United States v. Davidson (D. C.) 1 F. (2d) 465; 
Brown v. Cohn, 88 Wis. 627, 60 N. W. 826; ]'rank-
lin v. National Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 491; Holley v. 
Young, 68 Me. 215. 28 Am. Rep. 40; Hutchings 
v. Buck, 32 Me. 277. 
A motion addretlsed to the court for relief, 
sustained by proper proof, with due notice to 
opposing party, has been recognized as proper 
practice. Ish. v. Crane, 13 0 hio St. 57 4; In re 
Reed (D. C.) 117 F. 358. The opposing party 
must be given due notice of the proposed appli-
cation for relief. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria 
Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403, 22 S. Ct. 690. 46 L. Ed. 
968.'' 
But even where proper application for leave to 
repudiate a stipulation is made, relief therefrom lies in 
the sound discretion of the trial court, which ordinarily 
will not be interfered with on appeal. 50 Am. Jur. Pg. 
613. 
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So we say in the instant case that it having been 
formally stipulated that the defendant's sales were in a 
certain dollar amount, the proffered evidence tending to 
show that sales by sub-lessees w~:::re in fact defendant's 
sales, alHl thus defendant's sales were nearly a million 
dollars greater than as stipulah~d, was properly refused. 
B. THE LOW~JH COUHT DID NOT EHR IN RE-
FUSING PLAINTIFFS' OFF]JR OF PROOF 
Bl1JCAUSI1J 'rHE EVIDENCE OFFI1JRED WAS 
vVHOLLY 11\lMA'rERIAL. 
Tho second reason why the proffered evidence was 
properly refused, is that the record discloses that such 
evidence, going to the manner in which the sales were 
handled, the relationship between defendant and the 
sub-lesse(~S, employees, etc., was wholly immaterial. 
After plaintiffs had made their offer of evidence which 
they felt would tend to prove that what they had stipu-
lated as being sub-lessees' sales were not such at all, but 
were actually defendant's sales, the court inquired of 
plain tiffs' attorney : ( R17) 
''THE COUR'r: Let me ask this question, Mr. 
Riter. Suppose these lessees had operated 
entirely indepen.dent, they had no arrange-
ment-say just for the purpose of the 
argument-suppose they had operated en-
tirely independent, had their own cash 
register, had their own set up on every-
thing, 'Would you still contend their sales 
came under the terms of the lease?" 
A. ''Yes, I would, under the terms of the lease, 
quite frankly." 
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THE COURT: "Then with that, I'll sustain the 
objection to the evidence, if that is your 
contention.'' 
A. "Why certainly I contend that." 
THE COURT: "I'll sustain the objection." 
In other words, plaintiffs made obvious their posi-
tion to be that defendant was obligated to pay percent-
age rentals on the basis of the sub-lessees sales as such, 
and, accordingly, it became immaterial under plaiutiff8' 
own theory. and as the court was categorically informed, 
as to the detail of the sub-letting, and the manner in 
which the operations were carried on. Plaintiffs' theory 
in effect was that defendant was liable on the basis of 
all sales macle from the premises, whether its own sales, 
or the sales of sub-lessees. Hence, the offered evidence 
would not tend to establish any fact material to plain-
tiffs' case. 
We appreciate, of course. that if plaintiffs' theory 
was that defendant was liable only for its own sales, 
evidence tending to show that all or some of what had 
been referred to as snb-lessees' sales, were in fact de-
fendant's sales, might be material, except that such evi-
dence would be in direct conflict with the stipulated 
facts. But plaintiffs adhered to the proposition that de-
fendant was liable ou the basis of the sub-lessees' sales 
as such, and the proffered evidence obviously was Im-
material. 
This case was presented to the lower court upon 
the theory that defeudant was liable to plaintiff under 
the lease for percentage rentals based not only on its 
own sales, but also on sales of the sub-lessees. Those 
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figures were before the eourt, and stipulated and agreed 
to by the parties. -With those figures before the court, 
and with Mr. Riter's assertion to the court that defend-
ant was liable for the sub-lessees' sales as such, the only 
material quesiion -v:as the qnestion of law of whether 
the lease, by its terms, covered, or should be construed 
to cover, sales by snh-lPssees of lines of merchandise 
1lOH-compeiitive -..vith defendant's, as well as defend-
ant's, sales. Hence, the court's rejection of the prof-
fered evidence was not erroneous. but proper. 
The propositio1l may, perhaps, he stated in another 
way. The issue. as stated by Mr. Riter, was, in effect, 
that ddendnnt was liable on the basis of sub-lessees' 
sales, as well as it own. Thus the question of whose sales 
they may have been (so long as they were one or the 
other) was not material. Material facts are those which 
are essential io the case, and \Yithout which it could 
not be supported. Evidence. to be admissable, may be 
either faclLun probaudum, or factum probans, but it 
must be one or the other. That is. it must tend to prove 
either the ultimate issue, or a subsidiary fact which 
itself temlF_; to prove the nltimaie issue. The proffered 
evidence tended to prove neither, and hence its rejec-
tion was proper. 
It is elementary. of course, that where a case is 
tried on one theory in the court below, it may not be 
presented 011 a differeui theory on appeal. Here plain-
tiffs were asked the direct ques)Lion by the court if they 
contended that defendant was liable on the basis of the 
sub-lessees' sales even if il1'~ sub-lessees operated "en-
tirely independent'' of the defendant, and their reply 
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to this direct qnestio11 was a categorical and unequi-
vocal affirmative. In other words, their construction 
of the rental provisiom; of the lease was that the lease 
by its terms covered sales by independent sub-lessees. 
Such being the case it is aplJarent that the proffered 
tetimony was immaterial to the i::;sues as fixed by plain-
tiffs' own construction of the agreement, and they can-
not now complain because the court made its eviden-
tiary ruling in accord with plaintiffs' own construction 
of the agreement. 
THE LO\V J1~R COUR'I' Dl D NO 'I_' J~RR IN 
GRAN1'1NG DEF£~NDANT'S MOr.I'JON FOR 
NON-SUI'l', (A) BECAUSJ£ THI~ LEAS:BJ BY 
ers 1<JXPHJ1JSS TJ<JRMS OBLIGA'l'B~D 'I_'HE 
DEFENDANT TO PAY ON THE BASIS OF 
ITS OvVN SALES ONLY, AND, (B) IF THERE 
WAS ANY A~lBIGUI1'Y IN THE LEAS:B~ IN 
REGARD 'l'O 1'H]J BASIS OF PAYMENT, 
THF~ P ARr.I'UJS 'l'HEMSELVES CONSTRUED 
IT IN FAVOR 01<, 'I_'HE- DEFENDANT. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case the Defendan' 
moved for a judgment of non-suit. which was granted. 
vVe submit this ruling was proper, (a) because the lease 
by its terms obligated dofeudant to pay percentage 
rentals on the basis of its own sales only, and the evi-
dence conclusively showed that all such rentals had 
been paid; and, (b) because if there was any ambiguity 
in the lease in this regard. the parties themselves had 
so construed it. 
A. THE LEASE BY l'I_'S TERMS OBLIGAT:BJD 
'l'HE DEFRNDAN'l' 'l'O PAY ON THE 
BASIS OF l'l'S SAL:BJS ONLY. 
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Referring again to the lease itself it will be noted 
that the instrument first specifically defines the parties, 
provided that this defendant, Wright's Incorporated, 
is "hereinafter (in the lease) called the lessee". It 
then goes on 
''Awl said lessee ~, * * convenants to pay as 
the annual rental for said premises three (3) 
per cent of the total sales volume of the lessee, 
provided. however, that the lessee agrees to pay 
a miuimum rental of rr,,,o Thousand, Nine Hund-
red and Forty ( $2,940.00) Dollars per year * * 
'~ . " (Italics added). 
We submit that language could not be plainer, 
phraseology could not be more specific, nor the intent 
of the parties more clearly expressed. The language 
of the \vritten lease is that percentage rentals are to 
be based on the "sales volume of the lessee". But des-
pite this clear and concise language these plaintiffs 
(who are not the original lessors.) contend that there 
is an ambiguity. and that the court should construe the 
language ''sales volume of the lessee'' to read ''sales 
volume of the lessee, plus the scLles volurnes of any sub-
lessees''. 
The parties to the lease in Paragraph 3 thereof, 
specifically agreed 
"That neither the lessee nor its legal rep-
resentatives will let or underlet said premises, 
or assign this lease without the written assent 
of the lessor first had and obtained thereto, ex-
cept that said lessee may sublet space in the 
said premises to departments selling other lines 
of merchandise thau those offered for sale by 
the lessee that is to say women's coats, suits, 
furs, and dresses''. 
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The insertion of this provision in the lease com-
pletly stultifies any argument that the parties didn't 
have in mind that sub-lessees might occupy portions 
of the demised premises, because, after first insert-
ing a blanket prohibition against sub-letting without 
the lessor's assent, an exception to the prohibition was 
agreed upon, and specific authority granted to defend-
ant to sub-let portions of the premises to sub-lessees 
who handled lines of merchandise non-competitive to 
those handled by defendant. 
The provision was in every respect a normal one, 
and certainly not one to be viewed with suspicion, nor 
even strictly construed; but one entitled to liberal 
construction consonant with the obvious intent of the par-
ties. The defendant at that time was engaged in the busi-
ness of selling women's coats, suits, furs and dresses. We 
must assume that both parties were interested in a long 
term lease. Lessor wanted as rentals l% of the les-
sees' sale, but further vmnted to be protected to the 
extent of minimum aunual rental of $2,940.00. In add-
ition the parties further recongnized that by the adding 
of additional lines of women's wear, non-competitive 
with those handled by the defendant, defendant's sales 
of its own merchandise might well be enhanced to the 
benefit of both lessor and lessee. In other words, by 
having sub-lessees haudling. as became the case, wo-
men's hats and shoes, customers who entered the pre-
mises for the purpose of buying hats or shoes became 
immediately potential customers for coats, suits, furs 
and dresses. 
An examination of the sales figures representing 
defendant's sales volume demonstrates the foresight 
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of the parties in this connection. During 1939 (ten 
and one half months) defendants sales were $43,952.12. 
A full twelve months on this basis would have meant 
total sales of $50,232.00. Six per cent of this figure is 
roughly- $3,000.00 in rentals, approximating the $2, 
940.00 minimum rental the lessor demanded. But 
note how the sales increased in succeeding years: 
194(} _______________________________________________________ _ 
1941·-------------------------------------------------------
1942 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1943 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1944 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1945 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1946 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1947 _______________________________________________________ _ 
1948 _______________________________________________________ _ 
$ 57,044.05 
75,984.43 
123.550.52 
177,184.01 
180,134.12 
188,732.61 
146,619,52 
142,655.38 
149.843.28 
In other W?rds, from the low volume realized dur-
ing the first year, defendant's sales increased to a peak 
of $188,732.61 during the war year of 1945, and even 
during the last full year of the lease amounted to ap-
proximately three times the sales volume of the first 
year. 
When thus analyzed, plaintiffs' entire argument 
falls, and their authorities are demonstrated to be not 
in point. This isn't a case where sub-letting authority 
was used by the lessee to ''reduce'' rentals; or to 
''diminish the rent''; or by ''changing the character 
of the business"; or by failing to "conform to its pre-
vious methods''; or by effecting ''a change in the nature 
of the business"; or "to dismember its business". 
(Pages 24 to 33 of Plaintiffs' brim). 
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On the contrary, if the subletting had any effect 
at all. it is obvious that it enhanced, rather than re-
duced, defendant's sales volume, to the distinct benefit, 
rather than detriment, of the lessor and her daughters. 
these plaintiffs. And so. whether the relationship that 
the lessee bore to the lessor was sui generis, or quasi-
fiduciary, as urged by plaintiffs, or simply the ordi-
nary landlord and tenant relationship that we under-
stand ordinarily exists under lease agreements. the de-
fendant rendered to plaintiffs and to the lessor the full 
measure of its responsibilities. The parties agreed 
that the lessee might sub-let to sub-lessees handling 
non-competitive lines. and it is not suggested that it 
did more. The parties agreed that the percentage 
rentals were to be paid on the basis of the defendant's 
sales, and they were. Had the parties intended that 
percentage rentals were to be paid by the lessee on the 
sales by sub-lesse€s, a well as on its own, certainly they 
would have so provided in the lease. 
The lease is in no wise ambiguous. It fixes in clear 
and concise language the basis upon which the per·· 
centage rentals were to be paid, namely, on the "total 
sales volume of the lessee". To construe it to require 
the lessee to pay rentals on some other basis is to do 
violence to the plain language of the written instru-
ment. and to the obvious intent of the parties thereto. 
We submit that the applicable rule and the only 
rule to be applied to this case is as set out in 17 C. 
J. S. 695, as follows: 
"The intention of the parties is to be de-
duced from the language employed by them, and 
the terms of the contract, where unambiguous, 
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;n,~ uo11elusiv<', awl the rule making the terms 
ol' :J'e emtirad em1elm:ive where unambiguous 
i:: ccn: rolliur'; i11 llw ahs(~ncc of averment an.J 
pm<;i of mi:-.tn ke. t lw question heing, not what 
i;.L·,,.;Ol! muy h~tve exisicd in tlw minds of the 
parti(•;-',, fni'_ w11at lut()Jlliou is expressed by the· 
hm~·uagu used. 
In eonstrning ~md determining the effect of a 
\\r.itleu t(llli raet, the iutention of the parties 
and tlw meaning are gathered primarily from 
the eontenh; of the 1\Titing itself, or, as other-
wise' stated. from the four con1ers of the iustru-
rneut nnd \Vheu :-:neh contract ]s clear alHl unequ-
~\·oual, ii::; me:millg· must be determined hy its 
con tell ii-i alone; and a meaning cannot be given it 
othc~r than that exprei-it:ed. Hence words cannot 
be read into 11 contraet which import an intent 
wholly uuexyJressecl wheu the coutraet was exe-
cuted. \Vlwn' Uw contract evidencei'l care in its 
preparation, it will he presumed that its words 
werL' employed deliberately aml with intention . 
.h;ach cmli met mnst be construed aceording 
to its own term': u; h~nor, and the language em·· 
ployed must he: construed with reference to the 
cou Lext awl io the facts of the particular case. 
It is not Uw prov inee of the court to alter 
a eontraet by co11strudion or to make a new 
coutrael fur ih,e variimJ; its duty is confined 
to the interpretation of tlw one which they have 
made for themselves, and, in the absence of any 
~TomHi 1'or dm1;·illg eu:i'orm~meut, to enforcing 
or giviug cii'('C~ [o tl1c codraet as made, that is, 
1 o enforeu or give uiieeL to the contract as made 
Y>iihout regard to iLc1 ,,-isdom or folly, to the 
apparent wn·easmG~:leness of the terms, or to 
ihe fact that ilw rights of t!w 1mrties are not 
carefully guarded, as tlw couri cmmot supply 
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material ::;tipulations or read into the contract 
words which it doe:-; not contaiu so as to change 
the meaniug of words contained iu the contract.'' 
In numerous lJtah decisions this rule ha:-:; l)eeu 
applied and adhered to. ln the case of Middlctou 'I'. 
Evans et al, 86 Utah 396, 45 P2d 570 is this stated: 
"1t .is a well-established rule of law that 
where the language of a contract is clear aud un-
'lmbiguous, it is the duty of the court to deter-
mine the iutent of the parties from the lauguage 
used by the parties in the contract. \Vintle v. 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 73 Utah 215, 273 
P. 312; Armstrong v. Larst>n, 55 Utah 347, 186 
P. 97; Manti City Sav. Bank, v. Peterson, 3:1 
Utah 209, 83 P. 566, 126 Am. St. Rep. 817." 
And in Wiutle u. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 73 
Utah 215, 273 P. 312: 
''It, of course, is conceded that it is the duty 
of a court to determine the intent of the parties 
to a contract L·om the language used in the con-
tract, if such language .is clear and unambigu-
ous.'' 
And in lJ;htrplty v. 8alt Lake City, 65 Utah 295, 236 
P. 680: 
''Contract,.; are prepared and entered into 
for the com GHience and protection of the par-
ties, aud nnles:; waived the courts are bound to 
enforct~ them in accordance 'With the intention 
as the same is mauifested by the language used 
by the parties lo the contract." 
And in Richards irrigation Company v. West view 
Irrigation C. et al, 96 Lliall Jo:3, 80 P. 2d 458: 
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'' 'i'o this holding we cannot accede. Both 
s:des in','Olw tho settled doctrine that when a 
\\Titing i;,; eluar alHl plain on its face, not am-
h1gtWU;J or doubtful, there is uo room for cons-
i~·J;eiion 1mt n~sort must he had to the lang-
tm;~·p em]Jloyurl iu determining meaning or in-
tention. 'fhu rule is a sound one and fully appli-
cahlu to the disputed clauses in the agreement 
here in question. 'I' he language employed is 
uot doubtfnl or ambiguous; the meaning and 
iutent are com;picuously clear and plain." 
And iu First Natioual Bank of Salt Lake City v. 
llaymon.cl et al, 89 Utah 151, 57 P. 2d 1401: 
'' lllorever, to require the mortgagee to ac-
cept Uw mortgaged property iu lieu of the money 
which the mortgagors have agreed to pay would 
uc to 11Lake a contract fo·r tfte pa1'ties contrary 
to their agreement.'' 
And iu the case of Jensen v. Kidman et al, 85 
Utah 27. 38 P. 2cl ~)G:-:, this court quoted with approved 
tho rule as stated in 13 C. J. 525: 
"It is not the province of the court to alter 
a contract by construction or to make a new 
contract for the parties; its duty is confined to 
tho interprdatiou of the one which they have 
made for themselves, without regard to its wis-
dom or folly, as the court cannot supply mat-
erial stipulations or n•ad into the contract words 
which it does not contain.'' 
The rule so quoted by this court, in the case last 
above cited, is of particular significanee, as it is the 
contract of the original parties which is to be const-
rued herein, and not some agreement which these plain-
tiffs. as successors to the original lessor, deem should 
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have been made. Significant, indeed, is the fact that 
the lessor herself, Allie C. Baker, never raised the 
question now raised by these plaintiffs, awl it was 
only after her death. in fact several years after these 
plaintiffs succeeded to her interests, that any cmlten-
tion was made that rentals were not bei11g pai!l iu accord 
with the provisions of the lease. But more about that 
later. 
B. ASSUMING THA'r 'rHE. RI;JNTAL PRO-
VISIONS OF THE Ll<JASE ARE AMBIG-
UOUS, THE PARTIES THJ1JMSJ<JL YB~S 
ADOPTED A CONS'rRUCTION 'rHERE-
011' WHICH MAY NOT BE ABROGA'rED. 
The Plaintiffs have gone to considerable extent 
m their brief in arguing applicable rules of construc-
tion where an ambiguity is found in a written instru-
ment. Such rules have no relevancy, however, ~where 
the language of the instrument, as here, is clear, con-
sise and unequivocal. Bnt we now assume, for the pur-
pose of the argumellt that despite such clear, concise 
and unequivocal language, this court finds that an am-
biguity does exist, and the terms of the lease reqnire 
construction. What construction shall be given u? The 
parties themselves have collstrued the lease as fixing de-
fendant's obligation to pay percentage rentals on the 
basis of its sales only, which construction by the par-
ties we submit should not be disturbed. This is refer-
red to by the authorities as the doctrine of '' practi-
cal construction''. 
A general statement of the rule is to be found 
in 12 Am. Jur., (Contracts), Section 249, Page 787. as 
follows: 
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"In the determination of the meaning of 
an indefinite or ambiguous contract, the inter-
pretation placed upon the contract by the par-
ties themselves is to be considered by the court 
and is entitled to great. if not controlling, in-
fluence in ascertaining their understanding of 
its terms. In fact the courts will generally fol-
low such practical interpretation of a doubt-
ful contract. It is to be assumed that parties 
to a contract know best what was meant by its 
terms and are the least likely to be mistaken as 
to its intention; that each party is alert to pro-
tect his own interests and to insist on his rights; 
and that whatever is done by the parties dur-
ing the period of the performance of the contract 
is done under its terms as they understood and 
intended it should be. Parties are far less 
likely to have been mistaken as to the meaning 
of their contract during the period when they 
are in harmony and practical interpretation re-
flects that meaning than when subsequent dif-
ferences have impelled them to resort to law and 
one of them seeks an interpretation at variance 
with their practical interpretation of its provi-
sions. Where the languag·e of a contract is un-
certain and the parties thereto, by their sub-
sequent acts and conducts, have shown that they 
construed it alike and within the purview of 
the constructions permitted as possible by such 
language, the courts will ordinarily follow such 
adopted construction as the correct one. 
The facts in this case bring it squarely within the 
above rule. The contract provided for the payment 
by lessee of annual rental equivalent t~'-lJ%) per 
cent of its total sales volume, but not less than $2.940.00. 
It is apparent that for the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 
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1943 and 194ci no percentage rentals were paid at the 
conclusion of each respeetive year. hut only the hasie 
annual reutal of *2,940.00. This appears from the 
stipulation embodied iu the pre-trial order whereiu 
it is reflected that the first percentagp rentals oye1· 
and above the lnu:;ic reutals were paid 011 May 21, 1943, 
and covered the additional rentals predicated on tlw 
percentage basiC)! for the years 1D:-lD through 1!KL 'rlw 
amount of this payment on J\Iay 21, 1D-J-3, was in tlw 
amount of $3.997.08. (Par. 5 (b) of Pre-'1\·ial Order, 
R. - 021). 
Why the additional rentals computed on the 
percentage basis for each of the years 1D3D through 
1943 had not previously been paid, is uot made to ap-
pear, hut in any event. at the conclusion of the year 
1944 this over-sight was rectified by the payment ou 
May 21, 1945, of all accruals through 1D44. aml the 
payment of such accurals, based onJJ% of the defeud-
ant's sales o1tly, was Hceeptctl Ly these plaintiffs. r:rhis 
is reflected by Plaintiffs' l<Jxhibit "D" Leiug a letter 
from the defendant io Uw plaintiffs which accompanied 
defendant's check for the additional percentage rentals 
for the period 1:)3~) through 1944 in the amount of $3. 
997.08. 'l'he letter is as follows: 
WRlUH'l''S INCORPORATED 
\Vomen 's Appanel and Accessories 
Ogden, Utah 
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New York Office 
450 Seventh Ave. 
Chicago Office 
222 West Adams St. 
May 21, 1945 
!\Irs. IDtha B. Flowers 
!\Irs. Aura B. Horton 
l\[n.;. TuliP B. Rall<lall 
:2~06 Lilleoln Avenue 
Ogdell, Utah 
[)('ar i\1 a dames: 
11'ollowing is a snmmary of the sales of "Wright's 
Tllc." for the period ended December 1944. 
Total sales $661,23fi.OO 
() l' the total sales the lease proYides the lessor 
shall recc~iYe three per cent, aeeonlingly. A 
total rental clue for the period is $19,837.08 
Lcsll nmtals paid, G years at $2,940.00 15,840.00 
Adclitioual rental dne $3,997.08. 
Accordingly our check iu this amount is enclosed. 
_Made payable to the three heirs indicated above. 
CAW;ml 
Yours very truly 
WRIGHT'S INCORPORATED 
By C. A. ·wRIGHT, President 
Thus it is apparent that ill 1945, when the first 
computation of reutals 011 the percentage basis was 
made, that these ~laintiffs lmew that defendant was 
computing them on the basi::; of its sales only, and that 
plaintiffs accepted the rentals ou that basis. 
Now let's see what happem~d in succeeding years. 
On January 14, 1946, defenda11 t sent plaiutiff its check 
in the amount of $2,721.97, representing the difference 
between three (3%) per cent of its sales for the year 
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1945, and the lmsic l'Pllt:ll of $2,940.00 for that year. A 
letter accompanied sneh payment (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"E ") as follows: 
.January 14, 194G 
J\Irs. J1Jtlw B. F'l(nvers 
l\rrs. Aura B. Horton 
J\Irs. Tulie B. Hall(lall 
220G Lincoln A vPnue 
Ogden, Utah 
Dear Maclames : 
FollmYing is a summary of the sales of "\Vrig-ht's 
Inc.'' for the periorl ending December of 19-±5. 
l'lw toial sales is $188,732.60. 
01' tlw total sale;' the lease provides the lessor 
shall receive three per cent, accordingly. A total 
rental dne for the period is $5,GG1.m 
Less rentals paid for one year 
AdditiomJ rental clue 
2.9-:10.00 
$2,72UJ7 
Aceordingly onr check in this amouni is cmclosed. 
Made payahL• to the three heirs indicated above. 
Sincen•ly yours 
\VHIGII'l' 'S INCORPORATED 
By II. L. Yeagc•rs, Vice President 
HLY: ml 
Now as to lr>-Hi. U appears from l'aragmph 5 
(d) of the stipulatio1J c·m!JOdied ill the Pre-trial Order 
that on February J 7, HJr.-. dufendant paid io plaintiffs 
$1,358.59, m; aclditi(jld \ll'i '''<'llta:.;;e rentals due for 19-:16. 
l'he letter, if auy, wliie" ~~u·ompanied this payment is 
not in evidence, hut ou Febnwry 20, 1947, apparently 
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in respons€ to some inquiry by one of the plaintiffs, 
defendant wrote to Etha B. Flowers, one of the plain-
tiffs, a letter received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit '' F' '. which opened with the following statement: 
"Pursuant to your telephone call I have 
examined the record of sales and payments at 
Wright's Incorporated and find as follows: 
Then followed some detail with resp€ct to sales 
figures, but the significant factor is that it was tied 
specifically to sales by the defendant. 
On January 27 1948, defendant paid to plaintiffs 
as additional percentage rentals for the year 1947, the 
sum of $1341.70. rrhis payment was accompanied by 
a letter from defendant, as follows: 
WRIGHT'S INCORPORATED 
Women's Apparel and Accessories 
Ogden. Utah 
Chicago Office 
222 West Adams St. 
Mrs. Etha B. Flowers 
1378 Marilyn Drive 
Ogden, Utah 
Dear Mrs. Flowers : 
New York Office 
450 Seventh Ave. 
January 27, 1948 
Enclosed is the summary of the totals for 
the year of 1947. 
Total Sales year 194 7 
3% of above 
Rent Paid 194 7 
Balance 
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$142,723.21 
4,281.70 
2,940.00 
$ 1.341.70 
Enclosed is the check for the balance. 
Yours very truly, 
H. L. Yeager 
Vice President 
On January 31, 1949, defendant made a payment 
to plaintiffs in the amount of $1,555.30 as the additional 
percentage rentals for the year 1948. This payment 
was accompanied by defendant's letter as follows: 
Mrs. Etha B. Flowers 
1378 Marilyn Drive 
Ogden. Utah 
Dear Mrs. Flowers: 
January 31, 1949 
Following is a report of the sales of Wright's 
Inc. for the period ended December 31, 1948: 
Gross Sales $149,843.28 
4,495.30 Rent Computed at 3% 
Less Rents paid 12 months (a) 
$245. 2,940.00 
Balance Rent Due $ 1,555.30 
Accordingly our check for the balance due 
is enclosed. 
CW:me 
Encl - 1 
Yours truly. 
WRIGHT'S INC. 
C. A. Wright 
President 
Bear in mind that when this payment was made 
and this letter written, it was just fifteen days before 
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the expiration of the terrn of the lease, and represented 
payment in full for the last full year of the lease. This 
letter, as the previous ones did, made plain that the pay-
ment was predicated on the basis of 3% of defend-
ant's sales only. As in the case of previous payments, 
this paymeut ou that basis was accepted without ques-
tion by the plaintiffs. 
We submit that these several payments. and the 
several letters which accompanied the percentage ren-
tal checks established beyond doubt that defendant con-
strued its obligation to plaintiffs to be the payment of 
percentage rental on the basis of its sales, and not on 
the basis of its sales plus sub-lessees' sales, and that 
plaintiffs, by accepting payments on that basis, know-
ing such to be the construction placed on the lease by 
defendant, acquiesced therein. and cannot now be heard 
to say that some other construction should be adopted. 
A review of a few of the decisions should serve to 
illustrate the point. 
The case of Chick et al v. MacBain, (Va) 160 S. E. 
214, involved the rental clause of a lease. The court 
said: 
"We are further of opinion that the language 
in clause 11 of the lease, supra, is ambiguous. 
and that when the original term provided for by 
the lease expired and appellants paid the rent 
pursuaut to the provisions of the lease, as con-
strued by them, and without protest appellee ac-
cepted the payments for a period of three months, 
he acquiesced in the coustruction that appellants 
were to pay the sum of $235 per month for the 
first thirty months of the second term of five 
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years and $275 per month for the last thirty 
months of the second term. It is a well-recog-
nized principle of law that, when a written in-
strument is capable of more than one construct-
ion, then the courts will g-ive to it that con-
struction which the parties themselves have 
placed upon it. This is known as "the doctrine 
of practical construction.'' 
In Holland v. Vaughan, 120 Va. 328, 91 S. E. 
122, 124, Chief Justice Prentis said: "No rule 
for the construction of written instruments is 
better settled than that which attaches great 
weight to the construction put upon the instru-
ment by the parties themselves. * * *" 
In Chesapeak & Potomac 'rel. Co. v. Wythe 
1\Iut. Tel. Co .. 142 Va. 540, 129 S. E. 389, the rule 
stated in the Holland Case was applied. It is 
true that in the Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. 
Case the period of acquiescence extended over 
three years. The period of time, however, is not 
the criterion. The test comes when a party to 
the contract is asserting a right under the con-
tract as he conceives it. If the other party to 
the catttract contro-verts the assertion of the right, 
he should do so immediately. 
Under a proviso in the lease the lessor was 
given the option of changing the terms of the 
lease by giving six months' notice to such inten-
tion. No such notice was given. 
In view of the fact that no notice was given 
that appellee would contend that the future rental 
would be at the rate of $275 per month, and in 
view of the further fact that appellants relied 
for a period of three months upon their construc-
tion of the co11tract that the rental should be at 
the rate of $235 per month for the first thirtv 
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months, without protest upon the part of the ap-
pellee, it is a fair assumption that all parties to 
the contract placed the same construction upon 
it." 
We deem it sufficient to add to the foregoing what 
we believe to be the latest pronouncement by this court 
on the subject. In Trucker Sales Corpomtion v. Potter, 
104 Utah, 137 P. (2) 370, it is held: 
''On the other hand, the court's construction 
is that given the contract by the parties them-
selves. From October 1, 1938. when the contract 
was entered into, until August, 1941, almost three 
years, the partnership furnished plaintiff with 
duplicate slips and paid without question plain-
tiff's commission on all coal sold. Appellants 
first raised this question on October 6. 1941. 
Nothing could show the intention of the parties 
more clearly than the interpretation they them· 
selves placed upon a contract. It is well settled 
in this state that where the parties to a contract, 
with full knowledge of the terms thereof, by their 
actions before any controversy has arisen, place 
upon it a construction which is not contrary to 
the usual meaning of the language used the courts 
will follow that construction. Fowers v. Lawson, 
56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts v. Tuttle. 36 
Utah 614, 105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal & 
Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758; 107 Am. St. 
Rep. 689; Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Association, 
23 Utah 291. 64 P. 870; Woodward v. Edmonds, 
20 Utah 118, 57 P. 858; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 
11 Utah 331, 40 P. 206. 
In the instant case the defendant at all times con-
strued the lease as requiring it to pay rental on the 
basis of its sales only, and it did so pay. With each 
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payment of percentage rentals the plaintiffs wPre ad-
vised that the payment was on that basis. Plaintiffs 
accepted the payments so computed, evou up to aml in-
cluding those for the final year of the lPase. withcwt 
protest or objectiou of any kind. We sumbit that under 
such circumstances, and at the conclusion of tho touancy, 
plaintiffs may not now contend it to have been the in-
tention of their predecessor and this defemlant that pay· 
ment was to have been on some other basis. 
Assuming, therefor, for the sake of tho argument, 
that the provisions of the lease relating to rental pay-
ments are ambiguous. such provisions have been c;on-
strued by the parties themselves as fixing rentals ou 
the basis of defendant's sales only, and that construction, 
under the decisions of this court, is now final. 
It may not be amiss at this point to observe that i1; 
the construction of lease agreements, as contra di:3-
tinguished from contracts generally, a rule of construc-
tion of ambiguities against the lessor and in favor or 
the lessee, has beeu adopted. This rule of construction 
springs from the fact that a lease is regarded as a grant 
of the lessor, and so should be construed most strongly 
against him. Like all rules of construction, other factors 
may supply modifying effects, but the rule does have 
its place where lease agreements are under consider-
ation. In the case of Anderson v. Ferguson, (Wash.j 
135 P. (2) 302, the rule is thus expressed: 
''The convenant is at least capable of two 
constructions, but any ambiguity therein must be 
resolved in favor of the lessees, for it is well 
settled that where a lease is capable of more than 
one construction, tho courts will adopt that con-
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struction which is most favorable to the lessee. 
Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666,195 P.1046; 
Dicttrich v. J. ,J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18. 19 
P. 2d 115; National Bank of Commerce of Seattle 
v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P. 2d 535; Murray v. 
Odman, 1 Wash. 2d 481, 96 P. 2d 489. 
In Teeter v. Mid-West Enterprise Co. (Okla.) 52 P. 
(::l) 810. thus: 
"It is a well-settled rule of law that where a 
provision in a lease contract is ambiguous, and 
where there is no evidence to the contrary as to 
the intention of the parties, it should be construed 
against the lessors and in favor of the lessees. 
Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666, 195 P. 1046; 
Pierce et al v. N cw York Dock Co. ( C.C.A.) 265 
F. 148; Goldberg v. Pearl, 306 Ill. 436. 138 N. E. 
141; 507 Madison Avenue Realty Co., Inc., v. 
Martin, 114 1\Iisc. 315, 187 N.Y.S. 318; and Wil-
liams v. N otopolis. 259 PPa. 469, 103 A. 290. 
In Bah v. Pan A'tnerican Petrolenrn Corporation 
(La) 37 F. Supp., 785, thus: 
''In any event the most that can be said is 
that the language of the lease is of doubtful mean-
ing and as was said in a syllabus in the case of 
Murrell v. Lion, 30 La. Ann. 255, which was cited 
with approval in the case of Martin v. Martin, 
La. App. 181 So. 63: "Any doubt as to the in-
tentions of the parties to a contract of lease. aris-
ing out of uncertain terms of the contract, will be 
construed in favor of the lessee. It is the business 
of the lessor to have the agreement expressed in 
clear and certain terms.'' 
In The11unissen et al v. Huyler's, Inc. 25 F. (2) 530, 
thus: 
"Plaintiffs concede that 'it has long been 
settled law that in the case of a lease or other 
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written instrument of grant, the document is to 
be construed most strongly in favor of the grantee 
or lessee,' and such is the law.'' 
APPF~LLANT 'S CASES 
Plaintiffs cite a number of decisions of other courts 
relating to percentage rental agreements in support of 
their appeal. We desire to comment briefly thereon. 
because we believe that an examination thereof dis-
closes either that they are not in point at all, or that 
they support defendant's position, rather than plain-
tiffs'. 
First, however, we should observe that if other de-
cisions relating to other lease agreements are to be 
turned to it must be, ( 1) on the premise that this leo f:i~' 
is ambiguous. and so should be construed in accord w1th 
constructions placed on other ambiguous documeuL: 
without regard to the construction the parties themselves 
placed thereon, (which, as \Ye have shown, is at variance 
with Utah law); or (2) on the premise the parties could 
not lawfully contract as they did, and the court should 
construe the instrument as it feels the parties should 
have written it. The first we have already discussed 
and demonstrated its lack of merit. Further. the danger 
to be encountered in attempting to apply formulas tu 
the construction of contracts which are clear and unam-
biguous is appareut. These dangers were recognized 
by the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of 
Brown v. Bedell, et al, 188 N. E. 641 in the following 
language: 
"The court should be solicitous to gather the 
object and purposc:s of the parties from the laug· 
uage of their contract rather than from formulas 
applied to other cases.'' 
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The second premise is untenable on its face. These 
parties were free to contract as they saw fit. The lessor 
could have given the defendant occupancy rent free had 
she seen fit. She could have charged a flat rental, or 
she could, as she did, combine a basic rental with a per-
centage of defendant's sales. She might. had she seen 
fit, tied the percentage rentals into all sales from the 
premises, which would have included sales by sub-
lessees, or she might have based the percentage rentals 
on all of defendant's receipts from the premises, which 
would have included rentals received by defendant from 
sub-lessees, but not their sales. Or she might. as she 
did, elect to fix the rentals on the basis of defendant 'B 
sales, without regard to other receipts by defendant, or 
sales by sub-lessees. W c submit that in so doing she 
did nothing immoral, or unlawful. or contrary to public 
policy. She herself was satisfied with her lease and with 
the anticipated rentals thereunder. While her daughters 
may not now be satisfied with the lease as she made it, 
such dissatisfaction certainly is no basis for abrogating 
it. 
Now to plaintiffs' case relating to percentage rental 
agTeements. The first one cited is that of Garden Sub-
urbs Golf & Couutn; Club u. Pr-uitt (Fla.) 24 So. (2) 
989. The excerpt quoted therefrom by plaintiffs ap-
pears at Page 21 of their brief, and is as follows: 
''A percentage lease permitting the lessee 
to sublet portions of the premises, or concessions, 
or privileges therein, does not permit the lessee 
to deprive the lessor of a percentage of the gross 
receipts which would accrue from main revenue-
producing facilities. In other words, this sub-
leasing authority cannot be used to reduce the 
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percentage rental which would ordinarily accnte 
to the lessor from the revenue-producing facilitieJ 
ordinarily operated by the lessees." (Italics 
ours) 
The final sentence of the quotation contains the key, 
and discloses its inapplicability to the facts of the in-
stant case. Here the sub-lessees did not operate fa-
cilities "ordinarily operated by the lessee", and so conlc! 
not "reduce the percentage rental which would ordi-
narily accrue to the lessor." 
In Cissna Loan Co. v. Barron, (Wash.) 270 P. 1022 
(Page 25 of Plaintiffs' brief), the percentage rentals 
were based on the gross sales of the department ston· 
business conducted in the building. The lessee moved 
two important departments into adjoining premises. aud 
thus sought to avoid payment of rentals on sales there-
from. As pointed out by plaintiffs, the Washington 
court refused to approve such a course of conduct as 
would have the effect of reducing the rentals "whjc], 
would ordinarily accrue to the lessor". That again is a 
far cry from the principle of this case, where the lessee, 
instead of reducing its sales. enhanced them greatly by 
subletting for sales of merchandise non-competitive 
with its own. 
The rule announced by the New Jersey Court in the 
case of S. P. Du11ham Co. v. East State Street Develop-
ment Co., 35 A (2) 40. 49, (Pages 26 and 27 of Plaintiffs' 
brief), is likewise not in point. That rule is as follows: 
"The construction of the provisions of the 
lease here expressed is not to be understood to 
condone the removal by the claimant of its most 
lucrative and remunerative departments from the 
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aemised premises to other premises in the en-
deavor to diminish the rent to which the defend-
ant is justly entitled under the covenants of the 
lease. 
In Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores (La.\ 
194 So. 579, the lessee changed the character of its busi-
ness from that of a high class shoe store to that of a low 
order of business, consisting of continuous close out 
sales, cheap brands of shoes, etc. This case obviously 
is not in point. 
The significance of the cited case of JJfayfair Operat· 
ing Corp. v. Besse-mer Properties (Fla.) 7 So. (2) 342, 
(Page 29 of Plaintiffs' Brief), is not apparent to us, aE~ 
it appears not to be in point at all. However, at Page 
30 of the brief is a statement we cannot permit to go 
unchallenged. 
Plaintiffs there argue that the parties to this lease 
contemplated the defendant would sell "female weari11i:! 
apparel and all accessories and accouterments." This 
we categorically deny, as by the terms of the lease the 
defendant at most was obligated to continue its thPn 
operations of selling \vomen 's coats, suits, furs and 
dresses. As to other "accessm·ies and accouterments" 
it was given carte blanche sub-letting authority. 
Next follows a clisserta tion on the meaning of total 
sales, and the distinction between sub-lessees as such and 
sub-lessees of space. As to the meaning of total sales, 
we have no quarrel, so long as it is confined to defend-
ant's sales, as the lease confines it. We do deny, how-
ever, that the language of the lease ''total sales of the 
lessee" may be extended to include sales by persons 
other than the lessee, without doing violence to the 
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obvious intentions of those who themselves chose thr) 
language used. Further \Ve do not agree with plaintiffs' 
assertion (Page 36 of their brief) that the words "total 
sales volume of the lessee" possess such "au all in-
clusive quality. without limitations" as to bring in sales 
of anyone but the lessee. 
As to the distinction attempted between ''sub-
lessees" and "sub-lessees of space", we confess to 
losing ourselves. Apparently, however. plaintiffs con-
tend that inasmuch as the sublessees were "sublessees of 
space" they in fact were not sub-lessees at all, and 
hence their sales are not sales by sub-lessees, but in 
fact sales by the defendant. 
Of course the first answer to this is the stipulation 
of facts hereinbefore referred to. In such stipulation 
the sales are specifically distinguished-defendant's 
sales being agreed as being in the amount of $1,300,926.-
57; the sales of the sub-lessee selling shoes being $822.-
620.09; and the sales of the sub-lessee selling millinery 
being $131,330.73. What the argument seeks to do is 
to repudiate such stipulation, and throw the sales of the 
sub-lessees into the category of sales by the defendant. 
Further than that, hovvever, we cannot conceive that 
this court will consent to a violation of the obvious in-
tent of the parties to the lease, as specifically expressed 
in their written agreement. by holding that the sub-
letting authority was in fact no such authority at all. 
The words seized upon by plaintiffs, in this phase 
of their argument, appear to be the phrase in the lease 
that the lessee might ''sublet space in the said premises'' 
for sales of non-competitive lines of merchandise, which 
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follows as an exception to the provisiOn that the sub-
lessee may not sublet without the lessor's consent. The 
entire paragraph of the lease reads as follows: 
"That neither the ] essee nor its legal rep-
resentative will let or sublet said premises or 
assign this lease, without the written consent of 
the lessor first had and obtained, except that said 
lessee may sublet space in the said premises to 
departments selling other lines of merchandise 
than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is 
to say. women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses.': 
From this proviBion of the lease plaintiffs make 
what is to us the anomalous argument, 
u The parties clearly intended that the de-
fendant could not place a sub-tenant in the de· 
mised pretnises, whether that sub-tenant occupied 
all of the premises or only a part thereof." (Bot-
tom of Page 30 of Plaintiffs' Brief). 
How that conclusion can be draw from the foregoing 
language of the lease is beyond us. Plaintiffs explain 
it by saying that as there is a prohibition against sub-
letting generally, with an exception only in favor of 
sub-lessees of space in the premises, a sub-lessee of 
space is not a sub-lessee of any portion of the premises. 
Or to be concrete, one who might sublet the space con-
stituting the rear one-half of the premises. with the right 
to occupy and use such space, is actually not sub-letting 
anything. To this we pose the question, what then can 
constitute a sub-letting? All the lessee had to sub-let 
was space. Certainly a sub-tenant would not be inter-
ested in sub-letting any portion of the building itself, 
as contra-distinguished from space in the building. vVe 
submit that it is obvious that the parties to this leasE', 
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in using the phraseology they did, used words in tlwir 
ordinary sense. and in providing that the lessee might 
sub-let space in the premises for sales of non-compe6tiT\~ 
lines of merchandise, intended just that, and con tem-
plated that any such sub-letting would constitute the sub-
lessee a sub-tenant. 
To hold otherwise is to attribute to the parties the 
senselessness of i11serting in the lease a meaningless pro-
vision. To construe the general prohibition against sub-
letting as being all controlling is to render wholly in-
effective the exception. If, as contended by plaintiffs, 
the lessee could not sub-let, but only operate separate 
departments under its own direction and control. and 
which constituted a part of lessee's business as a whole 
(page 33 of Plaintiffs' Brief), the exception to the gen-
eral prohibition is meaningless. In other words, if all 
lessee could do was to install new departments and 
operate them itself as a portion of its over all oper-
ations, then the provision 
''except that said lessee may sublet space in the 
said premises to departments selling other lines 
of merchandise than those offered for sale by the 
lessee, that is to say, \vomen's coats. suits, furs 
and dresses.'' 
is wholly meaningless, because there is certainly nothing 
in the general prohibi~ion against sub-letting to preclude 
the lessee from enlarging its own operations at will. This 
excepting clause was obviously inserted to the end of 
modifying the geueral prohibition against sub-letting 
without lessor's conr,;ent, and constituted authority to 
defendant to sub-let without first obtaining permission, 
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where sales of non-competitive merchandise were con-
cerned. To hold that it was written into the lease solely 
for the purpose 
''of permitting the operation by others of de-
partments under defendants' control.'' (Page 31 
of Plaintiffs' Brief) 
is to say that the lessee had no such authority but for 
the proviso. But the general prohibition is directed 
wholly against sub-letting. not against the enlargement 
of defendant's operations, and thus, if so construed, 
renders entirely meaningless the excepting clause. As 
pointed out by this court in the case of Powerline Com-
pany v. Russell's Inc. 103 Utah 441, 135 P. (2) 906, 
''When possible the court should give effect to 
all words and clauses of the lease and construe 
the lease as a whole.'' 
The only \Yay in which this excepting clause can be 
given any effect or meaning whatever is to attribute 
to it the effect of modifying the clause containing the 
general prohibition against sub-letting. and when so con-
strued its effect is to permit a sub-letting of space in 
the leased premises to persons selling lines of merchan-
dise not sold by defendant. 
As pointed out by this court in the case of Vitagraph 
Inc. v. American Theatre Co. 77 Utah 71, 291 P. 303: 
"Taking its words in their ordinary and 
usual meaning, no substantive clause must be 
allowed to perish by construction, unless insur-
mountable obstacles stand in the way of any other 
course. Seeming contradictions must be har-
monized if that course is reasonably possible. 
Each of its provisions must be considered in con-
nection with the others, and, if possible, effect 
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must be given to all. A construction which en-
tirely neutralizes one provision should not be 
adopted if the contract is susceptible of another 
which gives effect to all of its provisions." 
And in Ed. of Ed. of Salt Lake City v. Wright-Os-
born Co., 49 Utah 453) 164 P. 1033, it is said: 
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that all 
the words used by the parties must. if possible, 
be given their usual and ordinary meaning and 
effect. It 'vill not be assumed that the parties to 
the contract did not intend what their language 
implies.'' 
Also Bonneville Lumber Co. v. J. G. Peppard Seed 
Co., 72 Utah 463, 271 P. 226: 
''It is a cardinal rule of construction, and 
the first to be applied whenever construction be-
comes necessary, that, unless technical terms are 
used. the language must be given its plain, ordi-
nary, and obvious meaning.'' 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit, that all rulings of the lower 
court upon the trial of this action were proper and cor-
rect. That with respect to plaintiffs' proffered evidence 
the court was correct in rejecting it. 
First, because it was directed toward the proof of 
facts in direct conflict with the written stipulation of the 
parties fixing the dollar amount of defendant's sales, 
and establishing that there were in fact sub- lessees hav-
ing substantial sales of their own; such stipulation 
specifically reciting that the facts therein agreed upon 
were ''for the purpose of this action''; and 
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Second. because by plaintiffs own statement in open 
court to the effect that defendant was liable regardless 
of whose sales they were, the proffered evidence was 
immaterial. 
That with respect to the lower court's granting· 
defendant's motion for non-suit, such ruling was correct 
and proper, 
First, because the lease by its specific and un-
ambiguous terms fixed the liability of the defendant to 
pay rentals on the basis of its own sales only, and it 
was agreed that all such rentals had been paid; and 
Second. the parties themselves, throughout the en-
tire term of the lease, had paid and accepted rentals 
based on defendant's sales only, which constituted a 
practical construction of the rental provisions of the 
lease, and one to be adopted and accepted by the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, S'riNE & OLMSTEAD. 
Attorneys for Defeudant and Respondent 
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